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Abstract 
This study analyzes the effects of macroeconomic and bank-level variables on the loan 
growth of banks in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) for the period 
between 1999 and 2010. Differences between private, state, domestic and foreign banks 
are analyzed by using the ownership structures of banks. We show that, unlike macro-
economic factors and other bank-level variables, leverage growth and equity growth have 
consistently significant effects on the loans of both domestic and foreign banks. The real 
exchange rate turns out to be a significant factor only for foreign banks. The latter result 
is important in understanding the transmission of global shocks to domestic credit. 
The results are robust to different specifications. 
1. Introduction 
Domestic credit growth has been noted as one of the most important signals 
of a financial crisis in the international finance literature. It is therefore crucial 
for policymakers to know the determinants of credit growth in order to proactively 
protect their economies. Based on the findings in the international finance literature 
on the relationship between credit growth and cross-border capital flows, this study 
tries to identify the effects of bank-specific and macroeconomic supply-side factors 
on credit growth in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). Special atten-
tion is given to the effects of the real effective exchange rate and bank leverage. 
CEECs have witnessed an economic transformation during the last two 
decades as a result of the transition to market economies, which accelerated during 
the EU membership process of these countries. Some key features of the trans-
formation include financial liberalization, rapid credit growth and privatization 
of commercial banks, as well as a general increase in the number of foreign banks 
operating in these countries. CEECs have gradually liberalized foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) flows before portfolio flows, capital inflows before capital outflows 
and long-term flows before short-term flows (von Hagen and Siedschlag, 2010). 
The advantages and disadvantages of liberalization of financial markets have been 
debated in the literature. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) empirically show that 
short-term disadvantages of financial market liberalization such as increased vola-
tility of financial markets are compensated, in the long-term, by regulations and 
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reforms that would improve financial institutions. The short-term disadvantages 
of liberalization are given as risky behavior of banks (Schneider and Tornell, 2004) 
and lending boom-bust cycles in imperfect financial markets (Tornell et al., 2003). 
To illustrate, for instance, during 2001–2010 domestic credit reached 38% of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in Bulgaria, while it was 30% in Romania and 23% in 
Hungary. On the bank ownership side of the story, the number of foreign banks 
operating in these countries increased to 262 in 2011 from 118 in 1997, while 
the number of domestic banks decreased to 123 in 2011 from 241 in 1997. This 
transformation of the financial markets and the banking sector in particular has raised 
questions about both the domestic lending of banks and their ownership statuses. 
Concerning domestic credit, it is the question of sustainable credit growth and the con-
sequences of economic shocks. On the ownership side, the focus is on the added 
value of foreign banks to the efficiency of the banking sector and their role as 
a transmission channel of shocks in their parent countries. It is argued that a foreign-
owned bank might carry shocks in the parent company’s economy to the domestic 
economy, thereby making a country exposed to shocks in other countries. Therefore, 
policymakers would be interested in the determinants of credit growth in order to 
keep track of it as an indicator of a financial crisis and the role of foreign banks 
in the stability of their respective economies. Accordingly, the banking sector can be 
regulated to mitigate possible negative effects of credit growth and bank ownership 
structures.  
The aim of this study is to investigate supply-side factors, namely banks’ 
balance sheet elements and macroeconomic indicators, on the growth rate of com-
mercial bank loans. The study first refers to the recent findings in the literature 
on the link between capital flows and domestic credit growth. Based on this link, 
focus is placed on the real exchange rate, leverage, leverage growth and equity 
growth, which are the crucial elements of the recent model by Bruno and Shin (2015) 
that tries to explain the relationship between cross-border capital flows and liquidity. 
Appreciation of the real exchange rate is empirically found to be one of the two most 
consistent predictors of a financial crisis by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), who 
find the most important one to be the credit growth. Therefore, this study tries to 
gauge the relationship between two important variables at the bank level. Regarding 
the previous results in the literature on the differences between domestic and foreign 
banks, we further analyze whether the ownership of banks makes a difference 
on the sign and size of the effect. Subsamples of domestic and foreign banks, namely 
government-owned and private domestic banks and greenfield and takeover foreign 
banks, are considered in order to identify the effects of the features of each owner-
ship status. 
Our findings underline the importance of the variables under consideration 
and point to the difference of foreign banks. Leverage growth and equity growth are 
the only variables that are consistently significant in all subsamples and under all 
robustness checks. None of the other bank-level or macroeconomic variables is found 
to be significant in all specifications and subsamples. Another robust result is that 
the real exchange rate is significant with the expected sign for the pooled sample and 
for the foreign bank subsample. When foreign banks are divided into further sub-
samples, the effect of the real exchange rate has a consistently significant effect only 
for the greenfield banks. 
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The study is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the literature 
on the linkages of capital flows and credit growth, describes key variables and their 
theoretical roles in the linkages, and summarizes the literature on the effects of bank 
ownership on domestic credit growth. Section 3 describes the dataset and variables 
used in the regressions, while Section 4 introduces the econometric methodology 
used in the study. Section 5 reports the main findings and robustness checks. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
The empirical analysis of the study relies on models and empirical findings 
provided in the literature on the relationship between capital flows and domestic 
credit growth, the effect of bank ownership on bank lending, and the influence 
of the real and the nominal exchange rates on lending behavior.  
First of all, the empirical literature provides evidence on a significant relation-
ship between the cross-border capital flows and domestic credit growth. The evidence 
implies that there is a positive correlation between domestic growth and capital 
flows. Magud et al. (2014) find that capital flows have a significantly positive effect 
on domestic credit growth in emerging European countries for the period between 
1999 and 2008, to which the authors refer as the “credit boom” period. Similarly, 
for 27 European countries between 2003 and 2008, Lane and McQuade (2014) find 
that increasing capital inflows as a result of financial integration, especially debt 
flows, significantly increase credit growth. Intuitively, the link can be explained by 
the increasing financial potential of the banking sector (Lane and McQuade, 2014). 
With financial integration, banks now add foreign depositors, borrowing on the inter-
bank money market, international bonds and foreign portfolio investors to their 
funding sources.  
Bruno and Shin (2015) built a model to explain changes in cross-border credit 
movements by focusing on equity, leverage and the real exchange rate. In this model, 
a bank tries to maximize the market value of its equity based on the balance sheet 
equation and the leverage constraint. In this context, the level of leverage refers to 
the rate a bank can transform a dollar increase in capital into lending. The model 
of Bruno and Shin (2015) implies that if the real effective exchange rate increases 
(e.g. because of local currency appreciation or US dollar depreciation), borrowing 
by local banksfrom global banks will increase at the aggregate level and cross- 
border flows will increase. It will have a similar effect as a decrease in credit risk. 
The model also implies that the real effective exchange rate is directly linked to 
the leverage decisions of banks and that both leverage and leverage growth are 
positively correlated with cross-border loans. The real exchange rate, however, is 
the only variable that is shown to be consistently significant and to have the theo-
retically correct sign in their empirical exercise. 
Even though the model does not explain the domestic lending behavior of com-
mercial banks per se, its implications can be used to explain changes in the domestic 
lending behavior of banks by the link between cross-border flows and credit growth. 
Variables that affect cross-border banking movements are expected to have effects 
similar to those of domestic credit growth since the cross-border borrowings of banks 
can be used as a source for financing domestic lending. In the case of real effective 
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exchange rate appreciation, a decline in credit risk or a decline in leverage or lever-
age growth, banks would borrow more from international markets and lend in domes-
tic markets, thus playing an intermediary role between international markets and 
domestic residents. The intuition for leverage is in line with Adrian and Shin (2010), 
who show that if a bank’s leverage decreases, it will try to increase its balance sheet 
by either borrowing from abroad, lending domestically or using both channels.  
Empirical evidence for the effect of leverage in credit growth is presented 
in Adrian and Shin (2014), who point out the link between the balance sheets 
of financial intermediaries and their lending activities. If a financial intermediary has 
a strong balance sheet, ceteris paribus, it will find that it is much easier to lend. 
According to Adrian and Shin (2014), the leverage of banks is procyclical and linked 
to their decisions on new assets, loans and securities purchases. 
A similar argument regarding the effect of the real exchange rate on credit 
growth is based on the Fisherian channel of the transmission of capital flows 
(von Hagen and Siedschlag, 2010), which can be summarized as follows:1 In coun-
tries with fixed exchange rate regimes, the relative prices of non-tradable goods will 
increase after an appreciation of the real exchange rate and the central banks will try 
to stabilize the nominal value of the exchange rate. Therefore, producers of non-
tradables will face a lower real interest rate and larger cash flows. This, in turn, will 
increase the value of their assets that can be used as collateral for bank loans. Thus, 
demand for credit will increase. 
The explanation above holds for economies with fixed exchange rates. The effect 
of deviations from the fixed exchange rate regime has also been questioned in 
the literature. Magud et al. (2014) empirically show that the flexibility of exchange 
rates has a negative impact on credit growth during credit boom periods. Their study 
is carried out using the de facto exchange rate regime classification of Reinhart and 
Rogoff. The results suggest that countries with less flexible exchange rates will have 
more credit growth and it is argued that this relationship might be explained by 
the absorption of capital inflows due to the appreciation of exchange rates in a purely 
floating exchange rate regime, while in a fixed exchange rate regime the effect will 
not be totally sterilized and the non-sterilized part of the inflows will lead to greater 
credit expansion than would be the case in a floating exchange rate regime (Magud 
et al., 2014). Another argument given by Montiel and Reinhart (2001) is that in 
a fixed exchange rate regime, banks might consider the fixed level of the exchange 
rate as a guarantee on foreign claims and look for more foreign funding. Finally, it is 
argued that incentives to borrow in foreign currencies might be higher in credible 
fixed exchange rate regimes (Magud et al., 2014). The role of exchange rate regimes 
in lending behavior at the bank level is tested by dropping the real exchange rate 
from the regressions and adding the regime variable.  
Lane and McQuade (2014) assume that the effect of financial integration works 
through its impact on domestic banks (i.e. financial integration increases the financing 
opportunities for domestic banks). However, the composition of bank ownership has 
undergone another transformation that has been argued to affect credit growth 
in European emerging markets. For instance, Aydin (2008) analyzes the reasons 
1 The line of arguments in von Hagen and Siedschlag (2010) is based on Calvo and Reinhart (2000), Calvo 
(2002) and Calvo et al. (2004). 
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for the rapid credit growth in CEECs and the role of bank ownership. The study 
shows that economic growth and deepening of financial markets in these countries 
during their transition to market economies were important for credit growth during 
the 1990s. It is pointed out that foreign banks facilitated credit growth in these 
economies and loans by foreign banks were higher on average than the loans 
provided by domestic banks. An interesting result of the study is that the funding 
of bank loans has changed over time. During the 1990s, foreign banks behaved like 
domestic banks and used customer deposits as a source of loans; later, however, they 
started to borrow more from their parent banks or other major banks (Aydin, 2008) to 
finance loans.  
Cull and Martinez Peria (2010) study the consequences of foreign bank par-
ticipation in developing countries. According to their findings, the efficiency 
of the banking sector increases after the market entry of foreign banks and the sector 
becomes more stable. This increase in the efficiency of the banking sector is also 
confirmed in a previous study by Claessens et al. (2001). The result relating to 
stability justifies the implications of Crystal et al. (2002), who find that foreign bank 
participation leads to less volatile credit growth. Cull and Martinez Peria (2010) also 
argue that foreign bank participation increases access to financing. 
Bruno and Hauswald (2014) find three real effects of the increase of foreign 
bank participation. First, the existence of foreign banks relaxes financial constraints 
in the market, which means that domestic residents have greater access to financing 
through the international links of the foreign banks (i.e. multinational banks and 
parent banks). Second, they overcome informational barriers to lending. Third, they 
mitigate the legal obstacles of debt contracting. Finally, Brown et al. (2011) show 
that foreign owned banks are more likely to reject loan applications than domes- 
tic banks, especially loan applications from small and government-owned firms. 
The authors argue that foreign owned banks “cherry pick” (i.e. are more selective) 
firms in host countries; therefore, only applications from big and transparent firms 
are approved.  
3. Data 
This study uses bank-level micro variables, foreign exchange regime specifi-
cation and macroeconomic indicators. The dataset covers the years 1999 to 2010 
and includes 14 Central and Eastern European emerging market economies, namely 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
The banking data comes from an unbalanced yearly dataset that has been 
used by de Haas et al. (2012). The dataset uses the Bankscope database of Bureau 
van Dijk for the bank specific data. The initial dataset contains information on 1,777 dif-
ferent banks. However, the availability of data for each bank changes throughout 
the years. The first reason for this is the addition of new banks to the dataset and 
deletion of existing ones, which might be due to several reasons such bankruptcy, 
acquisition or merger. The second reason is that not all variables in the dataset are 
consistently reported by each bank.  
The dataset reports changes in the ownership structure of banks. This feature 
of the dataset allows us to analyze the impact of bank ownership on domestic credit 
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Table 1  Number of Foreign and Domestic Banks 
 Number of Banks 
 Domestic Foreign 
 1999 2010 1999 2010 
Bulgaria 21 11 9 21 
Croatia 44 21 9 28 
Czech Republic 17 12 18 32 
Estonia 7 4 7 8 
Hungary 9 11 26 39 
Latvia 20 14 6 11 
Lithuania 9 4 5 7 
Poland 26 16 32 58 
Romania 19 9 11 25 
Russia 184 945 17 66 
Slovakia 15 4 10 19 
Slovenia 21 16 7 11 
Turkey 47 30 10 25 
Ukraine 32 43 7 35 
Total 471 1140 174 385 
Notes: The number of foreign and domestic banks for each country used in the dataset. The table gives 
the number of banks that exist in the dataset. 
 
growth. Table 1 reports the number of domestic and foreign banks in each country 
for the years 1999 and 2010. The first observation in the table is the increasing 
number of foreign banks and a drop in the number of banks in each country. The only 
exceptions are the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Even though the number of foreign 
banks is higher in these countries in 2010 compared to 1999, the number of domestic 
banks also increased in the same period, especially in Russia, where the number 
of domestic banks increased by a factor of eight. At the same time, the number 
of foreign banks in Russia grew from 17 to 66. 
A crucial aspect of the dataset is its compatibility with the aggregate values 
of domestic credit in CEECs, as other financial institutions can also provide credits to 
customers. The World Development Indicators (WDI) database published by the World 
Bank reports both domestic credit provided to the private sector in general and domes-
tic credit provided to the private sector by banks both as a ratio to GDP. According to 
these series, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the banking sector provides most 
of the credit to the private sector and, in some cases almost, all of the domestic credit. 
Therefore, the results of the study are expected to have implications not only 
on the lending behavior of the banking sector, also on the total domestic credit 
growth in CEECs.  
At the bank level, domestic credit is provided by the gross loans variable 
in the dataset (de Haas et al., 2012). Within the loan variables that give different loan 
categories of banks, gross loans is selected for two reasons. First, unlike the sub-
categories of loans, there are fewer missing values in this variable. Second, gross 
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Figure 1  Domestic Credit by Banks 
R
at
io
 
 
 year 
Note: Domestic credit to the private sector provided by banks as a share of GDP for all countries 
in the sample.  
Source: World Bank, WDI. 
 
Figure 2  Domestic Credit Comparison 
                  
Notes: Comparison of domestic credit and domestic credit provided by banks as shares of national GDP 
for the Czech Republic and Turkey. Dashed lines represent overall domestic credit as a share of GDP. 
Source: World Bank, WDI. 
 
loans successfully summarizes the domestic credit provided by banks. Table 2 reports 
the correlation of the ratio of the aggregated gross loans provided by the banks 
in the dataset to GDP with the domestic credit provided by banks as a share of GDP.' 
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Table 2  Correlation of Gross Loans and Domestic Credit 
 Correlation 
Bulgaria 0.95 
Croatia 0.95 
Czech Republic  
Estonia 0.22 
Hungary 0.87 
Latvia 0.97 
Lithuania 0.95 
Poland 0.68 
Romania 0.96 
Russia 0.93 
Slovakia 0.75 
Slovenia 0.97 
Turkey 0.94 
Ukraine 0.84 
Notes: Correlation of aggregated gross loans as a share of GDP with domestic credit provided by banks as 
a share of GDP for each country in the sample. 
 
Table 3  Key Variable Values 
  2001 2005 2008 2009 2010 All 
Credit growth All 0.19 0.22 0.27 -0.003 0.03 0.22 
 Foreign 0.24 0.21 0.16 0.02 -0.06 0.25 
 Domestic 0.16 0.23 0.3 -0.01 0.03 0.21 
Leverage All 8.1 7.3 7.6 7.0 5.9 7.4 
 Foreign 9.0 9.6 9.7 9.1 5.9 9.3 
 Domestic 7.7 6.5 7.2 6.6 5.9 6.8 
Equity growth All 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.03 0.17 0.2 
 Foreign 0.19 0.1 0.12 0.08 0.1 0.21 
 Domestic 0.14 0.17 0.26 0.02 0.17 0.2 
Note: Values of key variables over time for the pooled sample, foreign banks, and domestic banks. 
 
There is a strong positive correlation between the real value of domestic credit and 
the proxy variable in most of the countries. For Estonia, the correlation coefficient is 
0.22; for other countries, it goes up to 0.97. These correlations also support the use 
of the dataset as a proxy for the aggregate banking sector data. 
Values for credit growth, leverage and equity growth for certain years are 
given in Table 3. The table also distinguishes the values for the foreign and domestic 
bank subsamples. As displayed in the table, foreign banks are characterized by higher 
credit growth, leverage and equity growth even though the pattern changes for some 
years and is more apparent for leverage. Domestic banks and the whole sample suffer 
from negative credit growth in 2009, while foreign banks experience shrinkage in 
credit in 2010.  
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Changes in the foreign exchange regimes are collected from the annual reports 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The IMF classifies exchange rate regimes under four broad categories, 
which are hard pegs, soft pegs, floating regimes (market determined exchange rates) 
and residual. There are nine separate subcategories under the first three categories, 
which can be listed from the least flexible to the most flexible as no legal tender, 
currency board, conventional peg, stabilized arrangement, crawling peg, crawl-like 
arrangement, pegged exchange rate arrangements, floating and free floating. Exchange 
rate regimes that do not fit in any of these categories are grouped under “residual”. 
Macro variables and other financial indicators are retrieved from two sources. 
The annual GDP growth, consumer price index (CPI) and domestic debt as a share 
of GDP data are from the World Bank WDI database, and the national currency per 
US Dollar data are from the International Financial Statistics database of the IMF.  
The definitions of the variables used in the study are as follows: 
 Baseline bank-specific variables 
 Leverage is defined by the logarithm of ratio of assets to assets minus 
liabilities of a bank.  
 Leverage growth is the first difference of the Leverage variable.  
 Equity growth is generated by taking the difference of the logarithm of equi-
ties of a bank.  
 Macro variables  
 ΔRER is the change in the real effective exchange rate of a country. RER 
follows the definition used in Bruno and Shin (2015), which is logarithm 
of the nominal exchange rate times the ratio of US inflation and domestic 
inflation.  
 ΔGDP is the year-on-year GDP growth in a country.  
 ΔDebt/GDP is the growth of the ratio of gross debts to GDP.  
 ΔM2 is the growth of money stock (M2) in an economy.  
 Inflation is the inflation rate in a country.  
 VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX).  
 Other bank-specific variables 
 Deposits growth is generated by taking the difference of the deposits of a bank.  
 Profitability is the return on equity in percent.  
 Loan quality is the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans.  
 Loan/deposit ratio is the ratio of net loans to short-term funding in percent.  
 Efficiency is the ratio of cost to income in percent.  
 Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to the sum of deposits and short-term 
funding.  
In order to avoid the effects of possible mergers and acquisitions, the credit 
growth variable is trimmed if the value of the variable exceeds the 99th percentile. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables are given in Table 4. Table 5 reports the corre-
lation of the credit growth variable with bank-level variables and macroeconomic 
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Table 4  Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No 
Credit growth 0.217 0.331 -1.115 1.102 6974 
Leverage 8.446 22.353 -100.385 1589.499 5720 
Leverage growth 0.0 0.357 -2.12 4.868 5357 
Equity growth 0.206 0.348 -5.403 3.915 6957 
RER -0.059 0.097 -0.269 0.267 6959 
ΔM2 0.208 0.126 -0.63 0.945 6946 
ΔGDP 0.036 0.055 -0.18 0.122 6974 
ΔDebt/GDP -0.012 0.051 -0.391 0.162 6830 
Inflation 0.792 0.166 0.193 1.011 6974 
Deposits growth 0.146 0.857 -10.092 10.878 6324 
Profitability 10.051 27.297 -611.584 917.951 6960 
Loan quality 6.586 7.662 -2.392 100.0 6366 
Loan/deposit ratio 100.497 76.647 0.0 991.39 6891 
Efficiency 72.011 25.629 0.159 475.303 6940 
Liquidity 55.292 58.213 0.0 967.981 6902 
VIX 0.223 0.118 0.107 0.461 6974 
 
indicators. Credit growth has a negative correlation with ΔRER and a positive corre-
lation with leverage, leverage growth and equity growth; however, the correlation 
with the leverage variable is small compared to other correlation values.  
4. Econometric Methodology 
The panel data regression equation used in the study can be given as follows:  
                         
1 1
Δ   
 
    
m n
k j
it k it j it it
k j
GL c macrolevel banklevel  
where ΔGL is the growth of gross loans for bank i at time t, m is the number 
of macro-level variables, n is the number of bank-level variables and  2~ 0,  it IID  is 
the error term. ΔRER, GDP, Debt/GDP and ΔM2 are included as macrolevel variables. 
The macro-level variables are included in all regressions except the one with the VIX 
variable. For the banklevel variables, different permutations of the bank-level vari-
ables are used. Baseline bank-specific variables are first used one-by-one, then all 
together and with other bank-specific variables in order to see their robustness to 
inclusion of other variables.  
The regressions use a fixed effects model with year dummies and clustering 
of countries. The year dummies are added to the regressions for two reasons. The first 
reason is that empirical evidence suggests that banking behavior in lending might be 
different between normal times and financial crisis years (Peek and Rosengren, 2000; 
Goldberg, 2002; Peria et al., 2002; Everaert et al., 2015). By using year dummies, 
the effect of the crisis is assumed to be grasped by allowing the intercept to change 
every year. The second reason is that, as pointed out by Roodman (2006), inclusion 
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of time dummies makes correlation across individuals (i.e. banks in our case) less 
likely after an idiosyncratic shock. The variance estimator is clustered at the country 
level to handle the possibility of correlation in the error term.  
Before estimation of the fixed effects model, the Hausman test (Hausman, 
1978) is used to decide on fixed effects versus random effects models. According to 
the test statistics, the random effects model is significantly rejected.2  
The expected signs of the variables and differences between domestic and 
foreign banks can be given as follows: The leverage variable measures a bank’s 
capability of turning extra capital into lending while the difference variable shows 
the capability based on the existing capital stock. Both variables are expected to have 
a positive effect on credit growth. For foreign banks, which are assumed to have 
better international financial borrowing conditions, the effects of these variables are 
expected to be higher. 
The impact of country-specific economic conditions is measured by the macro 
control variables. A high economic growth rate is expected to have a positive impact 
on credit growth, while an increase in debt-to-GDP growth is expected to have 
a negative impact since accumulating debt might increase financial risk in a country. 
The money stock growth variable measures the effect of currency restrictions. In order 
to hedge itself against currency risk or benefit from changes in the foreign exchange 
markets, a bank should be able to borrow domestically, buy foreign exchange and 
deposit it or vice versa. A currency mismatch would mitigate this option. Therefore, 
ΔM2 is expected to have a positive sign and the effect is expected to be more 
significant for foreign banks.  
The expected sign of inflation is ambiguous. Although inflation increases 
nominal credit, at the same time it is associated with a drop in credit growth (see e.g. 
Égert et al., 2006) because of its negative impact on growth, creation of uncertainty 
due to the increased volatility of high inflation rates and the unwillingness of banks 
to lend when they experience high inflation rates. 
In addition to the macro control variables, separate regressions will be carried 
out using the VIX index. This variable is used to analyze the impact of global risk 
on domestic loans. As global risk increases, domestic credit is expected to decrease. 
For foreign banks, which are more likely to be influenced by global conditions due to 
their relations with their parent banks, the magnitude of the impact is expected to be 
higher. 
Deposits growth measures the effect of the funding conditions of an individual 
bank on credit growth (de Haas and Lelyveld, 2014). A bank with better funding 
conditions is expected to have a higher rate of credit growth. The effects of other 
bank-level variables are ambiguous and they are added to the regressions as control 
variables. 
 
 
2 The results are available upon request. It must be noted that the random effects model is not significantly 
rejected for small model specifications of state-owned banks. However, for the largest model this is not 
the case and the insignificance of the fixed effects model for these cases does not affect the main conclu-
sions derived from the regressions. 
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Table 6  Pooled Sample Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Leverage 0.0057** (2.38)   
0.0013 
(1.03) 
0.0029** 
(2.42) 
Leverage  
growth  
0.16*** 
(19.72)  
0.47*** 
(20.60) 
0.51*** 
(26.20) 
Equity  
growth   
0.22*** 
(14.91) 
0.54*** 
(29.25) 
0.61*** 
(31.11) 
ΔRER -0.68*** (-4.79) 
-0.67*** 
(-4.68) 
-0.58*** 
(-5.32) 
-0.28** 
(-3.01) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.78) 
ΔM2 -0.082 (-0.75) 
-0.11 
(-0.84) 
-0.054 
(-0.73) 
-0.0026 
(-0.04) 
0.0028 
(0.05) 
ΔGDP 2.39*** (3.26) 
2.26** 
(2.95) 
1.72** 
(2.76) 
0.92** 
(2.47) 
0.63 
(1.60) 
ΔDebt/GDP -1.18** (-2.17) 
-1.35*** 
(-3.12) 
-0.45 
(-1.28) 
-1.07*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.72*** 
(-4.12) 
Inflation 0.77*** (3.05) 
0.59** 
(2.54) 
0.53*** 
(3.19) 
0.40*** 
(3.07) 
0.41** 
(2.44) 
Deposits  
growth     
0.017*** 
(10.77) 
Profitability     -0.00060 (-1.63) 
Loan quality     -0.011*** (-22.73) 
Loan/deposit  
ratio     
0.0014*** 
(21.25) 
Efficiency     -0.00052* (-1.88) 
Liquidity     -0.0014** (-2.85) 
Constant -0.49** (-2.84) 
-0.20 
(-1.27) 
-0.24** 
(-2.20) 
-0.18* 
(-2.10) 
-0.078 
(-0.81) 
No 5624 5289 6771 5289 4675 
R overall 0.205 0.261 0.276 0.488 0.519 
R between 0.094 0.162 0.192 0.447 0.430 
R within 0.274 0.312 0.306 0.472 0.575 
No of banks 1338 1318 1396 1318 1198 
Notes: Regression results for the pooled sample. Fixed effects regression with time fixed effects and country is 
chosen to be the group variable for the variance estimator. t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Baseline Results 
Table 6 displays the estimation results for various specifications for the pooled 
sample. The exact specification does not substantially change the results, though 
GDP growth becomes insignificant in the richest specification (5) and leverage 
in specification (4) when leverage growth is also included. Note that the number 
of banks in the sample changes slightly due to data availability in the range from 
1,198 to 1,396 depending on the specification. The R2 substantially increases from 0.205 
to 0.519: adding bank-specific variables therefore significantly adds to the explanatory 
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Table 7  Private Domestic Banks Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Leverage 0.0096*** (14.20)   
-0.0017* 
(-1.98) 
0.0025 
(1.49) 
Leverage  
growth  
0.15*** 
(14.51)  
0.45*** 
(18.55) 
0.49*** 
(25.21) 
Equity  
growth   
0.23*** 
(12.17) 
0.51*** 
(21.04) 
0.61*** 
(41.92) 
ΔRER -0.55** (-2.35) 
-0.81*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.56*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.38** 
(-2.51) 
-0.24 
(-1.57) 
ΔM2 -0.047 (-0.46) 
-0.00077 
(-0.01) 
-0.048 
(-0.57) 
0.11* 
(1.88) 
0.092* 
(2.09) 
ΔGDP 2.02* (2.02) 
1.97* 
(1.96) 
1.63* 
(1.88) 
0.75 
(1.37) 
0.35 
(0.75) 
ΔDebt/GDP -1.55 (-1.71) 
-1.81** 
(-2.47) 
-0.39 
(-1.00) 
-1.48*** 
(-3.34) 
-1.29*** 
(-3.22) 
Inflation 0.49* (2.03) 
0.32 
(1.74) 
0.27 
(1.22) 
0.31** 
(2.26) 
0.24 
(1.32) 
Deposits  
growth     
0.016*** 
(21.50) 
Profitability     -0.00021 (-1.09) 
Loan quality     -0.010*** (-39.32) 
Loan/deposit  
ratio     
0.0015*** 
(39.94) 
Efficiency     -0.00081*** (-3.23) 
Liquidity     -0.0019*** (-22.80) 
Constant -0.24 (-1.57) 
-0.15 
(-1.12) 
-0.13 
(-0.90) 
-0.18* 
(-1.95) 
0.0092 
(0.08) 
No 3978 3810 4589 3810 3541 
R overall 0.245 0.272 0.304 0.482 0.508 
R between 0.150 0.187 0.265 0.529 0.428 
R within 0.286 0.313 0.310 0.458 0.575 
No of banks 1021 1009 1071 1009 939 
Notes: Regression results for the domestic private banks subsample. Fixed effects regression with time fixed 
effects and country is chosen to be the group variable for the variance estimator. t-statistics 
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
power of the model. The sample regressions therefore corroborate the findings by 
Bruno and Shin (2015) at the bank level.  
The results show that credit growth shows a close link with both macroeco-
nomic and bank-specific variables. While the former certainly model credit demand, 
the latter can to some extent be interpreted as capturing supply-side factors. According 
to our analysis and for the full sample, the change in the debt/GDP ratio is negatively 
linked to credit growth, whereas inflation is positively linked to credit growth. As 
nominal credit growth will in general be affected by inflation, this also gives insights 
on whether inflation is detrimental to real private credit growth. With a coefficient 
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Table 8  State-owned Banks Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Leverage 0.0044 (0.55)   
-0.00066 
(-0.10) 
0.0058 
(0.56) 
Leverage  
growth  
0.16*** 
(5.08)  
0.49** 
(2.90) 
0.40* 
(2.07) 
Equity  
growth   
0.16*** 
(3.42) 
0.54** 
(3.04) 
0.47** 
(2.44) 
ΔRER -0.77*** (-3.44) 
-0.69** 
(-2.57) 
-0.57** 
(-2.36) 
-0.15 
(-0.50) 
-0.10 
(-0.34) 
ΔM2 0.14 (0.82) 
0.084 
(0.45) 
0.11 
(0.73) 
0.20** 
(2.69) 
0.054 
(0.66) 
ΔGDP 3.96*** (3.41) 
3.59*** 
(3.81) 
3.12** 
(2.81) 
2.08** 
(2.49) 
1.63* 
(2.02) 
ΔDebt/GDP -0.76 (-1.38) 
-0.57 
(-0.97) 
-0.25 
(-0.71) 
-0.31 
(-0.55) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
Inflation 1.71*** (3.68) 
1.12*** 
(3.33) 
1.36** 
(2.73) 
0.59* 
(1.81) 
0.56 
(1.67) 
Deposits  
growth     
0.034 
(1.12) 
Profitability     -0.0015 (-0.79) 
Loan quality     -0.022*** (-4.56) 
Loan/deposit  
ratio     
0.0014* 
(1.98) 
Efficiency     -0.0014 (-1.29) 
Liquidity     -0.00015 (-1.08) 
Constant -1.02*** (-3.22) 
-0.95*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.80** 
(-2.27) 
-0.58* 
(-2.13) 
-0.080 
(-0.44) 
No 368 338 441 338 268 
R overall 0.110 0.177 0.115 0.474 0.413 
R between 0.003 0.026 0.028 0.412 0.420 
R within 0.275 0.312 0.259 0.473 0.532 
No of banks 76 74 79 74 62 
Notes: Regression results for the state-owned banks subsample. Fixed effects regression with time fixed 
effects and country is chosen to be the group variable for the variance estimator. t-statistics 
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
of less than 1, inflation in fact dampens credit growth (Guo and Stepanyan, 2011). 
The positive coefficient of GDP growth as a standard explanatory variable for credit 
growth becomes insignificant when the full set of micro variables is added, meaning 
that its role is captured by one of those measures. 
In the pooled sample, changes in the real exchange rate show a significantly 
negative sign, meaning that a depreciation of the domestic currency goes along with 
an increase of the credit volume.  
Finally, a broad set of bank-specific variables turn out to be relevant. All coef-
ficients except the one for profitability are significant. Both leverage and leverage 
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Table 9  Foreign Banks Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Leverage 0.0027** (2.19)   
0.0019 
(1.61) 
0.0023*** 
(3.09) 
Leverage  
growth  
0.20*** 
(3.97)  
0.54*** 
(5.29) 
0.63*** 
(10.30) 
Equity  
growth   
0.19*** 
(6.57) 
0.59*** 
(6.84) 
0.70*** 
(11.31) 
ΔRER -0.62*** (-3.96) 
-0.52*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.63*** 
(-4.91) 
-0.21** 
(-2.89) 
-0.19** 
(-2.54) 
ΔM2 -0.015 (-0.25) 
-0.061 
(-1.03) 
-0.026 
(-0.44) 
-0.064* 
(-2.13) 
-0.050* 
(-1.82) 
ΔGDP 1.31** (2.53) 
1.43** 
(2.33) 
1.21** 
(2.62) 
0.57** 
(2.42) 
0.55* 
(1.88) 
ΔDebt/GDP -1.72*** (-3.82) 
-1.70*** 
(-4.11) 
-1.03* 
(-2.09) 
-1.10*** 
(-3.94) 
-0.39 
(-1.39) 
Inflation 0.87*** (3.06) 
0.77*** 
(3.47) 
0.59** 
(2.73) 
0.34** 
(2.72) 
0.23 
(1.70) 
Deposits  
growth     
0.0052 
(0.89) 
Profitability     -0.00014 (-0.31) 
Loan quality     -0.0029 (-0.81) 
Loan/deposit  
ratio     
0.0012*** 
(4.13) 
Efficiency     0.0016*** (3.16) 
Liquidity     -0.0014* (-2.03) 
Constant -0.45** (-2.30) 
-1.13*** 
(-4.70) 
-0.23 
(-1.52) 
-0.61*** 
(-4.78) 
-0.67*** 
(-5.29) 
No 1278 1141 1741 1141 866 
R overall 0.190 0.274 0.251 0.497 0.613 
R between 0.120 0.148 0.129 0.254 0.417 
R within 0.307 0.396 0.334 0.552 0.679 
No of banks 286 276 311 276 230 
Notes: Regression results for the foreign banks subsample. Fixed effects regression with time fixed effects and 
country is chosen to be the group variable for the variance estimator. t-statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
growth show the expected positive relation with credit growth; the same applies to 
equity and deposit growth and the loan/deposit ratio, indicating a link between 
the ability to lend and credit growth. These coefficients therefore reflect the supply 
side of the credit market. The coefficient for loan quality is found to be significantly 
negative, indicating that a rapid credit expansion may happen at the cost of lower 
credit quality or that picking high-quality loans limits credit expansion. 
Furthermore, we find that efficiency and liquidity are negatively linked with 
credit growth. As de Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) point out, the expected sign 
for these variables is indeterminate. This is because, on the one hand, liquidity ratios 
 
442                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 66, 2016, no. 5 
Table 10  Greenfield Banks Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Leverage 0.0041 (1.63)   
0.0011 
(0.80) 
0.0027*** 
(3.05) 
Leverage  
growth  
0.25*** 
(9.90)  
0.59*** 
(8.46) 
0.62*** 
(9.54) 
Equity  
growth   
0.19*** 
(4.33) 
0.65*** 
(7.93) 
0.73*** 
(8.61) 
ΔRER -0.68*** (-3.63) 
-0.68*** 
(-4.84) 
-0.56*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.18* 
(-1.88) 
ΔM2 -0.015 (-0.20) 
-0.052 
(-0.78) 
-0.062 
(-0.86) 
-0.068 
(-1.64) 
-0.019 
(-0.52) 
ΔGDP 1.39** (2.18) 
1.63** 
(2.53) 
1.17** 
(2.70) 
0.56** 
(2.89) 
0.35 
(1.09) 
ΔDebt/GDP -1.38*** (-3.09) 
-1.57*** 
(-3.61) 
-0.79 
(-1.50) 
-1.03*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.63* 
(-1.80) 
Inflation 0.78** (2.53) 
0.82*** 
(3.63) 
0.56** 
(2.56) 
0.36** 
(2.37) 
0.40* 
(1.80) 
Deposits  
growth     
-0.013 
(-1.48) 
Profitability     -0.00071 (-1.26) 
Loan quality     -0.0072** (-2.67) 
Loan/deposit  
ratio     
0.0013*** 
(3.76) 
Efficiency     0.0015* (2.10) 
Liquidity     -0.0012* (-1.82) 
Constant -0.41* (-2.05) 
-1.17*** 
(-4.69) 
-0.15 
(-1.03) 
-0.61*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.23* 
(-2.00) 
No 823 738 1079 738 539 
R overall 0.139 0.236 0.214 0.528 0.632 
R between 0.063 0.061 0.093 0.408 0.592 
R within 0.258 0.374 0.284 0.547 0.665 
No of banks 164 157 178 157 127 
Notes: Regression results for the greenfield (foreign) banks subsample. Fixed effects regression with time 
fixed effects and country is chosen to be the group variable for the variance estimator. t-statistics in 
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
may reflect risk aversion and thus a moderate expansion of credit and vice versa or, 
on the other hand, because high excess liquidity may enable banks to rapidly expand 
their credit portfolios.  
The analysis for the subsamples in Tables 7–11 shows some remarkable dif-
ferences between the groups. Concerning the macro variables, the link between GDP 
and credit growth breaks is particularly pronounced for state-owned banks. While 
there are no consistent differences between the subsamples in the coefficients of money 
growth, the debt/GDP ratio and inflation, the macroeconomic variables turn out to 
differ between subsamples but do not show a consistent pattern. 
Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 66, 2016, no. 5                                       443 
Table 11  Takeover Banks Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Leverage 0.0015** (2.43)   
0.0025** 
(2.43) 
-0.0013 
(-0.45) 
Leverage  
growth  
0.11 
(1.03)  
0.42* 
(1.92) 
0.71*** 
(8.95) 
Equity  
growth   
0.17*** 
(3.47) 
0.46*** 
(3.12) 
0.71*** 
(12.16) 
ΔRER -0.50*** (-3.42) 
-0.25 
(-1.44) 
-0.72*** 
(-5.12) 
-0.073 
(-0.49) 
-0.17 
(-1.50) 
ΔM2 -0.055 (-0.78) 
-0.16** 
(-2.54) 
0.056 
(0.79) 
-0.15** 
(-2.67) 
-0.14 
(-1.58) 
ΔGDP 1.34*** (3.52) 
1.32** 
(2.73) 
1.17* 
(1.90) 
0.72** 
(2.51) 
1.16*** 
(3.34) 
ΔDebt/GDP -2.39*** (-3.43) 
-1.60*** 
(-3.27) 
-1.74** 
(-2.27) 
-1.00* 
(-1.94) 
0.33 
(1.01) 
Inflation 1.08** (2.90) 
0.52 
(1.66) 
0.77** 
(2.90) 
0.063 
(0.20) 
-0.37 
(-1.05) 
Deposits  
growth     
0.012** 
(2.34) 
Profitability     0.00034 (0.50) 
Loan quality     0.011** (2.65) 
Loan/deposit  
ratio     
0.00090*** 
(3.08) 
Efficiency     0.0018 (1.50) 
Liquidity     -0.0041*** (-4.73) 
Constant -0.57** (-2.33) 
-0.060 
(-0.27) 
-1.11*** 
(-4.08) 
0.14 
(0.70) 
0.35 
(1.31) 
No 455 403 662 403 327 
R overall 0.302 0.400 0.317 0.514 0.587 
R between 0.182 0.273 0.160 0.232 0.327 
R within 0.461 0.506 0.453 0.608 0.769 
No of banks 122 119 133 119 103 
Notes: Regression results for the takeover (foreign) banks subsample. Fixed effects regression with time fixed 
effects and country is chosen to be the group variable for the variance estimator. t-statistics 
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Leverage growth and equity growth all have the expected signs and are 
consistently significant at the 1% level in every specification. They seem to be 
the main drivers of credit growth in all bank categories. Similar to Bruno and Shin 
(2015), however, we do not see the same consistency in the leverage variable, with 
the coefficient also being quite small. Other variables except loan quality and loan-
to-deposits ratio do not give consistently significant results. Inflation is only sig-
nificant for the greenfield banks subsample. These results provide empirical evidence 
for the model developed in Bruno and Shin (2015) with micro data. 
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The sign of the real exchange rate variable is still intuitively correct, but it 
is significant throughout only for the subsample of foreign banks. In contrast, for 
domestic private banks, the coefficient in absolute terms is larger than the one for 
foreign banks, but it loses its significance in the specification with all bank-level 
variables. The picture for (domestic) state-owned banks is similar. In summary, 
we do find some evidence that the real exchange rate channel is typical for foreign 
banks, but we cannot conclude that it exclusively works through these banks. It also 
seems to affect private domestic banks to some extent and, to an even lesser extent, 
state-owned banks. 
5.2 Effect of Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes 
The previous subsection analyzed the impact of real exchange rate changes 
on the growth rate of loans and found that—for the full sample—a depreciation 
of domestic currencies goes along with increased credit growth. A related question 
deals with the impact of the exchange rate regime on credit growth. One would 
expect credit growth to be higher under a pegged exchange rate regime for a couple 
of reasons. First, Magud et al. (2014) describe how capital inflows create a link between 
the exchange rate regime and credit expansion. While under a floating exchange rate 
capital inflows appreciate the domestic currency, there will be no further effects on 
monetary aggregates. This only partly holds under a fixed regime, when the central 
bank is forced to intervene. The reason for this is that sterilization of the intervention 
is costly and therefore in most cases incomplete and the monetary base is expanded. 
As a consequence, more rigid exchange rate regimes are likely to be accompanied 
by stronger credit growth when capital flows in. Second, as Montiel and Reinhart 
(2001) point out, deposit insurance for claims acquired by foreign depositors on domes-
tic banks coupled with a pegged (e.g. guaranteed) exchange rate reduces the banks’ 
cost of attracting external funds. Accordingly, they increase their lending capacity. 
At the same time, a pegged exchange rate creates incentives for taking on debt 
in a foreign currency. 
Therefore, we drop the changes in the real exchange rate and replace them 
with a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the regime is flexible and 
zero if it is rigid. Instead of the nine regimes defined by the IMF, floating exchange 
rate regimes are taken to represent the positive value in the dummy variable in order 
to avoid further fragmentation of the data in the subsample regressions. Other 
regimes are taken to be the rigid regimes. The results are displayed in Table 12. For 
the pooled sample, we find a highly significant relation between the flexibility of the ex-
change rate regime and credit growth, corroborating the findings by Magud et al. 
(2014): If the exchange rate regime moves towards a more flexible one, credit growth 
increases. This relation, however, no longer remains significant when we turn to 
the subgroups of banks. Although the sign of the coefficient remains positive for all 
bank groups, it is no longer significant.  
5.3 Effect of VIX 
Finally, we follow the approach of Bruno and Shin (2015) and use the VIX 
index as a proxy for global leverage. The rationale is that when global risk increases, 
capital inflows to emerging markets will decrease (Forbes and Warnock, 2012). 
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Table 12  Exchange Rate Regime Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Leverage 0.00056*** (5.12) 
0.00041*** 
(3.42) 
0.0025 
(1.43) 
0.0057 
(0.58) 
0.00056** 
(2.50) 
-0.0019 
(-0.73) 
Leverage 
growth 
0.52*** 
(29.09) 
0.65*** 
(11.09) 
0.49*** 
(24.56) 
0.40* 
(2.07) 
0.64*** 
(9.97) 
0.73*** 
(9.87) 
Equity growth 0.62*** (33.23) 
0.70*** 
(11.44) 
0.61*** 
(43.86) 
0.47** 
(2.46) 
0.73*** 
(8.96) 
0.72*** 
(12.62) 
ER Regime 0.035*** (3.24) 
0.014 
(1.13) 
0.020 
(1.07) 
0.050 
(1.11) 
0.013 
(1.19) 
0.0076 
(0.28) 
ΔM2 0.015 (0.31) 
-0.053 
(-1.59) 
0.094* 
(2.05) 
0.053 
(0.81) 
-0.017 
(-0.49) 
-0.16 
(-1.67) 
ΔGDP 0.69* (1.92) 
0.51* 
(1.88) 
0.36 
(0.79) 
1.72** 
(2.35) 
0.28 
(0.85) 
1.14*** 
(3.50) 
ΔDebt/GDP -0.62** (-2.38) 
-0.23 
(-0.84) 
-1.24** 
(-2.52) 
0.42 
(0.87) 
-0.54 
(-1.64) 
0.52 
(1.64) 
Inflation 0.61*** (3.38) 
0.20 
(1.45) 
0.37 
(1.15) 
0.91 
(1.69) 
0.43* 
(1.80) 
-0.46 
(-1.37) 
Deposits  
growth 
0.016*** 
(10.73) 
0.0043 
(0.71) 
0.015*** 
(20.23) 
0.032 
(1.06) 
-0.014 
(-1.66) 
0.011** 
(2.35) 
Profitability -0.00052 (-1.60) 
-0.00026 
(-0.59) 
-0.00019 
(-1.20) 
-0.00099 
(-0.55) 
-0.00089 
(-1.63) 
0.00029 
(0.43) 
Loan quality -0.011*** (-19.22) 
-0.0040 
(-1.42) 
-0.010*** 
(-38.58) 
-0.022*** 
(-4.37) 
-0.0081*** 
(-3.77) 
0.0093** 
(2.40) 
Loan/deposit  
ratio 
0.0014*** 
(20.78) 
0.0011*** 
(4.02) 
0.0015*** 
(39.51) 
0.0015* 
(1.97) 
0.0012*** 
(3.68) 
0.00087** 
(2.86) 
Efficiency -0.00039 (-1.55) 
0.0016*** 
(3.21) 
-0.00078*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.0011 
(-1.06) 
0.0014* 
(2.07) 
0.0019 
(1.49) 
Liquidity -0.0014** (-2.90) 
-0.0014* 
(-1.99) 
-0.0019*** 
(-24.08) 
-0.00018 
(-1.19) 
-0.0011* 
(-1.79) 
-0.0042*** 
(-5.37) 
Constant -0.39** (-2.55) 
-0.66*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.18 
(-0.60) 
-0.69 
(-1.19) 
-0.29 
(-1.51) 
0.39 
(1.33) 
No 4685 876 3541 268 543 333 
R overall 0.487 0.594 0.500 0.358 0.622 0.564 
R between 0.385 0.392 0.419 0.375 0.588 0.303 
R within 0.574 0.676 0.575 0.535 0.664 0.769 
No of banks 1199 231 939 62 127 104 
Notes: Results for regressions with the exchange rate regime variable. The columns report results for 
(1) the pooled sample, (2) domestic private banks, (3) state-owned banks, (4) foreign banks, 
(5) greenfield banks and (6) takeover banks, respectively. Fixed effects regression with time fixed 
effects and country is chosen to be the group variable for the variance estimator. t-statistics 
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Therefore, an increase in the VIX should go along with a decrease in bank loans due 
to a reduction in capital flows.  
The results of the regressions with the VIX index as an additional variable are 
displayed in Table 13. The sign for the real exchange rate remains negative when 
the VIX is added. The coefficient for the VIX itself, however, shows the expected 
sign only for domestic banks. For the other bank groups, the coefficient is insignifi-
cant and positively signed. This means that for all groups other than domestic banks, 
credit growth increases in line with global uncertainty. 
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Table 13  VIX Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Leverage 0.0054** (2.21) 
0.0093*** 
(14.50) 
0.0041 
(0.58) 
0.0027* 
(1.97) 
0.0013 
(1.48) 
0.0041 
(1.54) 
ΔRER -0.46** (-2.18) 
-0.29 
(-1.04) 
-0.35 
(-1.25) 
-0.46** 
(-2.27) 
-0.38* 
(-1.84) 
-0.49* 
(-2.08) 
VIX 0.16 (0.95) 
-0.074 
(-0.31) 
0.54** 
(2.69) 
1.18*** 
(5.88) 
1.57*** 
(13.75) 
1.04*** 
(4.12) 
Constant -0.097* (-2.04) 
-0.046 
(-0.70) 
-0.17** 
(-2.63) 
-0.52*** 
(-6.29) 
-0.69*** 
(-12.95) 
-0.48*** 
(-4.77) 
No 5709 4030 375 1304 463 841 
R overall 0.221 0.244 0.181 0.216 0.355 0.155 
R between 0.132 0.150 0.127 0.163 0.229 0.094 
R within 0.260 0.279 0.220 0.285 0.417 0.243 
No of banks 1344 1027 76 287 122 165 
Notes: Results for regressions with the VIX index. The columns report results for (1) the pooled sample, 
(2) domestic private banks, (3) state-owned banks, (4) foreign banks, (5) greenfield banks and (6) take-
over banks, respectively. Fixed effects regression with time fixed effects and country is chosen to be 
the group variable for the variance estimator. t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01. 
 
5.4 Robustness Checks 
5.4.1 GMM Estimation 
A robustness check with the generalized method of moments (GMM) is 
carried out for two reasons. The first reason is that previous studies such as de Haas 
and Lelyveld (2014) show that, at the bank level, there is a statistically significant 
relation between credit growth and its first lag. Therefore, a lagged credit growth 
variable is included in the regressions and the problems that such inclusion entails are 
solved by estimating the equation using a GMM estimator as suggested in the litera-
ture. The second reason is the possibility of endogenous relations of the bank-level 
variables.  
The GMM model is estimated using the system GMM estimator for panel data 
developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) (AB). The two-
step GMM estimator is used to account for the possibility of heteroskedasticity in 
the data. The two-step GMM estimator is reported to give downward biased standard 
errors, so the finite sample correction of Windmeijer (2005) is employed. In the esti-
mation of the models, lags of credit growth, leverage, leverage growth, equity growth, 
loan quality, loan-to-deposit ratio, and liquidity from the bank-level variables are 
assumed to be endogenous, while the macroeconomic variables are treated as strictly 
exogenous variables.  
The regressions are carried out with the longest specification that used both 
macroeconomic variables and bank-level variables. The results of the GMM estima-
tions are given in Table 14.3 The results for leverage growth and equity growth are 
robust to the GMM estimation. The results show that for the pooled sample and 
 
3 The AB GMM estimations are sensitive to changes in the number of instruments and a Hansen p-value 
that is close to 1 indicates that there might be a problem with the number of instruments used (Roodman, 
2006). The number of lags of the endogenous variables is constrained to get the best possible results from 
the regressions. 
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Table 14  Robustness, GMM Estimation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Leverage 0.0082*** (2.83) 
0.0076* 
(1.82) 
0.0029 
(0.29) 
-0.00015 
(-0.19) 
-0.000011 
(-0.01) 
-0.00016 
(-0.05) 
Leverage  
growth 
0.44*** 
(6.10) 
0.36*** 
(4.90) 
0.33* 
(1.92) 
0.64*** 
(11.36) 
0.83*** 
(7.34) 
0.81*** 
(4.92) 
Equity growth 0.58*** (9.71) 
0.53*** 
(7.06) 
0.46*** 
(3.31) 
0.65*** 
(11.73) 
0.85*** 
(6.16) 
0.91*** 
(4.88) 
ΔRER -0.29*** (-3.07) 
-0.48** 
(-2.49) 
-0.20 
(-0.66) 
-0.14* 
(-1.68) 
0.0084 
(0.06) 
-0.064 
(-0.43) 
ΔM2 0.033 (0.57) 
0.066 
(0.94) 
0.058 
(0.35) 
-0.075 
(-0.90) 
-0.027 
(-0.16) 
-0.11 
(-1.19) 
ΔGDP 0.25 (0.97) 
0.46 
(1.29) 
1.55 
(0.88) 
0.57** 
(2.34) 
-0.072 
(-0.18) 
-0.081 
(-0.14) 
ΔDebt/GDP -0.49** (-2.29) 
-0.86*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.79 
(-0.54) 
-0.34 
(-1.27) 
-1.50 
(-1.59) 
-0.84 
(-1.15) 
Inflation -0.11 (-1.05) 
0.058 
(0.47) 
-0.080 
(-0.20) 
-0.052 
(-0.50) 
0.14 
(0.45) 
-0.12 
(-0.39) 
Deposits 
growth 
0.019 
(0.66) 
0.053* 
(1.90) 
-0.0011 
(-0.01) 
0.0096 
(0.46) 
-0.063 
(-1.27) 
-0.018 
(-0.20) 
Profitability 0.0017* (1.72) 
0.0012 
(0.83) 
-0.0024 
(-0.76) 
-0.00014 
(-0.19) 
-0.0013 
(-0.84) 
-0.00015 
(-0.13) 
Loan quality -0.0087*** (-3.17) 
-0.0082*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.0070 
(-1.14) 
-0.0061 
(-1.64) 
-0.0091 
(-0.94) 
-0.012 
(-1.37) 
Loan/deposit 
ratio 
0.00056** 
(2.03) 
0.00083*** 
(3.09) 
0.0020** 
(2.29) 
0.00068** 
(2.22) 
0.0015*** 
(2.87) 
0.00086 
(1.32) 
Efficiency 0.00083 (1.49) 
-0.000095 
(-0.13) 
0.00016 
(0.07) 
0.0029*** 
(4.54) 
0.0014 
(0.75) 
0.00093 
(1.04) 
Liquidity 0.00019 (0.92) 
-0.00051 
(-1.28) 
-0.00043** 
(-2.05) 
-0.00016 
(-0.18) 
-0.00078 
(-0.42) 
-0.0018* 
(-1.87) 
ΔGL(-1) -0.19*** (-3.57) 
-0.21*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.24* 
(-1.95) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.075 
(-1.48) 
-0.21*** 
(-2.94) 
Constant 0.023 (0.20) 
0.023 
(0.20) 
-0.0046 
(-0.01) 
-0.011 
(-0.10) 
-0.45 
(-1.23) 
0.29 
(0.98) 
No 3718 2705 230 783 488 295 
Hansen  
p-value 0.126 0.878 0.972 0.901 0.817 0.393 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.020 
AR(2) p-value 0.981 0.923 0.624 0.769 0.607 0.590 
No insts 296 296 75 236 76 74 
Notes: Results for GMM estimations with the two-step Bond (2002) estimator with Windmeijer (2005) cor-
rection of standard errors. The leverage, leverage growth and equity growth variables are assumed to 
be endogenous; the macroeconomic variables are assumed to be exogenous. ΔGL(-1) denotes  
the first lag of the credit growth variable. Year dummies are included. The columns report results for  
(1) the pooled sample, (2) domestic private banks, (3) state-owned banks, (4) foreign banks, (5) green-
field banks and (6) takeover banks, respectively. t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
 
foreign banks, the real exchange rate variable is still significant. The real exchange 
rate is also significant for the domestic private banks and takeover banks but, as 
reported below, the results are not robust to other specifications. 
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Table 15  Robustness, Net Loans 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Leverage 0.0029** (2.31) 
0.0025 
(1.51) 
0.015 
(1.70) 
0.0018 
(1.66) 
0.0022** 
(2.35) 
-0.0015 
(-0.47) 
Leverage 
growth 
0.49*** 
(18.79) 
0.46*** 
(19.32) 
0.32 
(1.80) 
0.65*** 
(7.79) 
0.64*** 
(7.43) 
0.65*** 
(6.64) 
Equity growth 0.58*** (25.92) 
0.59*** 
(31.64) 
0.39* 
(2.23) 
0.69*** 
(10.93) 
0.68*** 
(8.64) 
0.69*** 
(8.22) 
ΔRER -0.32*** (-4.94) 
-0.47* 
(-2.11) 
-0.100 
(-0.35) 
-0.21* 
(-2.04) 
-0.22 
(-1.74) 
-0.22 
(-1.76) 
ΔM2 -0.058 (-1.21) 
-0.012 
(-0.25) 
0.071 
(0.93) 
-0.089* 
(-1.94) 
-0.059 
(-1.17) 
-0.18** 
(-2.30) 
ΔGDP 0.72 (1.58) 
0.49 
(1.10) 
1.61 
(1.64) 
0.66* 
(2.04) 
0.58 
(1.42) 
1.08** 
(2.40) 
ΔDebt/GDP -0.69*** (-3.87) 
-1.16*** 
(-3.41) 
0.29 
(0.50) 
-0.60* 
(-1.99) 
-0.78* 
(-2.04) 
0.12 
(0.28) 
Inflation 0.39** (2.59) 
0.27 
(1.20) 
0.27 
(0.71) 
0.28 
(1.26) 
0.44 
(1.53) 
-0.35 
(-0.82) 
Deposits 
growth 
0.022*** 
(11.09) 
0.021*** 
(25.66) 
0.056 
(1.60) 
-0.0077 
(-0.65) 
-0.019* 
(-1.90) 
0.061 
(0.89) 
Profitability -0.00047 (-1.22) 
-0.000050 
(-0.19) 
-0.0013 
(-0.50) 
0.00016 
(0.36) 
-0.00016 
(-0.31) 
-0.00023 
(-0.39) 
Loan quality -0.020*** (-33.92) 
-0.020*** 
(-28.65) 
-0.017*** 
(-4.56) 
-0.0083** 
(-2.78) 
-0.0098*** 
(-4.34) 
-0.0028 
(-0.51) 
Loan/deposit 
ratio 
0.0016*** 
(18.99) 
0.0017*** 
(39.44) 
0.0022** 
(2.62) 
0.00062* 
(1.97) 
0.00071* 
(1.81) 
0.00065 
(1.26) 
Efficiency -0.00031 (-0.98) 
-0.00047 
(-1.62) 
-0.00080 
(-0.90) 
0.0016** 
(2.60) 
0.0017* 
(2.11) 
0.0012 
(1.00) 
Liquidity -0.0013** (-2.32) 
-0.0021*** 
(-38.23) 
-0.00016 
(-1.68) 
-0.0013* 
(-1.80) 
-0.0011 
(-1.46) 
-0.0034** 
(-2.40) 
Constant -0.15 (-1.31) 
-0.039 
(-0.20) 
-0.027 
(-0.11) 
-0.65*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.24 
(-1.26) 
0.45 
(1.55) 
No 3718 2705 230 783 488 295 
R overall 0.511 0.484 0.464 0.677 0.643 0.713 
R between 0.442 0.386 0.501 0.684 0.618 0.666 
R within 0.600 0.606 0.559 0.709 0.690 0.785 
No of banks 1109 860 61 214 119 95 
Notes: Results with net loan growth instead of gross loan growth. The columns report results for (1) the pooled 
sample, (2) domestic private banks, (3) state-owned banks, (4) foreign banks, (5) greenfield banks and 
(6) takeover banks, respectively. Fixed effects regression with time fixed effects and country is chosen 
to be the group variable for the variance estimator. t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
 
5.4.2 Net Loans 
As mentioned earlier, there are different definitions of loans provided by banks 
in the dataset and we choose to use gross loans, which are defined as net loans plus 
loan loss reserves. In order to check the robustness of the baseline results with a dif-
ferent definition of loans, regressions are carried out by defining credit growth as 
the change in net loans.  
The regression results with the net loans credit growth variable are given 
in Table 15. The results for leverage growth and equity growth are robust to the new 
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Table 16  Robustness, Small Sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Leverage 0.0029** (2.42) 
0.0025 
(1.49) 
0.0058 
(0.56) 
0.0023*** 
(3.09) 
0.0027*** 
(3.05) 
-0.0013 
(-0.45) 
Leverage 
growth 
0.51*** 
(26.20) 
0.49*** 
(25.21) 
0.40* 
(2.07) 
0.63*** 
(10.30) 
0.62*** 
(9.54) 
0.71*** 
(8.95) 
Equity growth 0.61*** (31.11) 
0.61*** 
(41.92) 
0.47** 
(2.44) 
0.70*** 
(11.31) 
0.73*** 
(8.61) 
0.71*** 
(12.16) 
ΔRER -0.23*** (-3.78) 
-0.24 
(-1.57) 
-0.10 
(-0.34) 
-0.19** 
(-2.54) 
-0.18* 
(-1.88) 
-0.17 
(-1.50) 
ΔM2 0.0028 (0.05) 
0.092* 
(2.09) 
0.054 
(0.66) 
-0.050* 
(-1.82) 
-0.019 
(-0.52) 
-0.14 
(-1.58) 
ΔGDP 0.63 (1.60) 
0.35 
(0.75) 
1.63* 
(2.02) 
0.55* 
(1.88) 
0.35 
(1.09) 
1.16*** 
(3.34) 
ΔDebt/GDP -0.72*** (-4.12) 
-1.29*** 
(-3.22) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
-0.39 
(-1.39) 
-0.63* 
(-1.80) 
0.33 
(1.01) 
Inflation 0.41** (2.44) 
0.24 
(1.32) 
0.56 
(1.67) 
0.23 
(1.70) 
0.40* 
(1.80) 
-0.37 
(-1.05) 
Deposits 
growth 
0.017*** 
(10.77) 
0.016*** 
(21.50) 
0.034 
(1.12) 
0.0052 
(0.89) 
-0.013 
(-1.48) 
0.012** 
(2.34) 
Profitability -0.00060 (-1.63) 
-0.00021 
(-1.09) 
-0.0015 
(-0.79) 
-0.00014 
(-0.31) 
-0.00071 
(-1.26) 
0.00034 
(0.50) 
Loan quality -0.011*** (-22.73) 
-0.010*** 
(-39.32) 
-0.022*** 
(-4.56) 
-0.0029 
(-0.81) 
-0.0072** 
(-2.67) 
0.011** 
(2.65) 
Loan/deposit 
ratio 
0.0014*** 
(21.25) 
0.0015*** 
(39.94) 
0.0014* 
(1.98) 
0.0012*** 
(4.13) 
0.0013*** 
(3.76) 
0.0009*** 
(3.08) 
Efficiency -0.00052* (-1.88) 
-0.0008*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.0014 
(-1.29) 
0.0016*** 
(3.16) 
0.0015* 
(2.10) 
0.0018 
(1.50) 
Liquidity -0.0014** (-2.85) 
-0.0019*** 
(-22.80) 
-0.00015 
(-1.08) 
-0.0014* 
(-2.03) 
-0.0012* 
(-1.82) 
-0.0041*** 
(-4.73) 
Constant -0.078 (-0.81) 
0.0092 
(0.08) 
-0.080 
(-0.44) 
-0.67*** 
(-5.29) 
-0.23* 
(-2.00) 
0.35 
(1.31) 
No 4675 3541 268 866 539 327 
R overall 0.519 0.508 0.413 0.613 0.632 0.587 
R between 0.430 0.428 0.420 0.417 0.592 0.327 
R within 0.575 0.575 0.532 0.679 0.665 0.769 
No of banks 1198 939 62 230 127 103 
Notes: Results with banks that have at least seven consecutive years of observations. The columns report 
results for (1) the pooled sample, (2) domestic private banks, (3) state-owned banks, (4) foreign banks, 
(5) greenfield banks and (6) takeover banks, respectively. Fixed effects regression with time fixed 
effects and country is chosen to be the group variable for the variance estimator.t-statistics 
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
credit growth specification, while the exchange rate variable is only significant 
in the pooled sample and foreign bank regressions.  
5.4.3 Small Sample 
The baseline regressions use the banking data regardless of the survival time 
of banks during the study period. One criticism of this approach would be that 
the results might be driven by the banks that have only a few observations 
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in the dataset. This point is taken into account by repeating regressions with banks 
that have more than seven years of data. 
Table 16 gives the results with the smaller dataset. As can be seen in the table, 
the number of banks in the pooled regressions drops to 1,198 from 1,338. The main 
points of the baseline regressions are confirmed with the smaller dataset. 
6. Conclusions 
This study analyzes the link between credit growth with supply-side bank-
level and macroeconomic variables. It turns out leverage growth and equity growth 
are the dominating determinants. Furthermore, the real exchange rate has a signifi-
cant impact through local banks. The variables we find to be relevant play a role 
in cross-border capital flows in the Bruno and Shin (2015) model. 
We do not find that other macroeconomic variables play a prominent role; 
the same applies to bank-specific variables. The results are robust to a couple of modi-
fications. Furthermore, we investigate whether credit growth is affected by the flexi-
bility of the exchange rate regime. We do find that credit growth differs depending 
on the aggregate level. The coefficient of the exchange rate regime dummy has 
a negative sign, but the link becomes insignificant for all bank groups in the sample. 
Therefore, we conclude that the exchange rate regime plays a marginal role com-
pared with the impact of the (real) exchange rate itself. Our results therefore are in 
conflict with those of Magud et al. (2014), who conclude that flexibility of exchange 
rate regimes has a negative influence of domestic credit growth. 
Our analysis therefore revisits some previous findings from the literature, but 
adds to it by testing the role of the real exchange rate in the determination of loans 
at the bank level. This aspect is particularly interesting in the course and aftermath 
of the recent financial crisis, during which the US dollar appreciated against most 
emerging-market currencies. Our results might also provide guidance in policy-
making as the US dollar returns to its pre-crisis value. 
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